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NEPAL: ELECTING CHAOS 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Nepal’s royal government is inviting confrontation by 
forcing through, amidst a new crackdown on civil liberties, 
municipal elections on 8 February 2006 which will not 
be free, fair or credible. Filling local posts with palace 
placemen will neither restart the national democratic 
process, nor bring a peace process closer. The conflict 
remains soluble: although the palace has refused to 
reciprocate a four-month Maoist ceasefire and the rebels 
have resumed their armed campaign, mainstream parties 
and the Maoists have agreed a roadmap which permits 
compromise with the monarchy. But after one year of royal 
rule and ten years of insurgency, the priority should be 
that peace process, not polls for offices with little power 
that all mainstream parties are boycotting.  
Holding elections in any conflict situation is a risky 
undertaking. In Nepal’s case, the polls are only the latest in 
a series of moves which have inflamed political tensions 
and increased the polarisation between the palace and other 
political forces. The mainstream parties retain considerable 
support and, with the Maoists agreeing not to impede their 
activities, are bringing increasing numbers onto the streets. 
But Maoist support for the boycott has given the king 
an excuse for a security clampdown and hundreds of non-
violent political protestors are still under arrest. The use of 
the army to suppress dissent has brought back memories of 
royal opposition to the 1990 democracy movement. 
With the first anniversary of the 1 February 2005 royal 
coup approaching, the elections are a matter of pride for 
the king. He is unwilling to compromise, even though far 
fewer candidates have put themselves forward than there 
are seats available. The local elections are meant to pave 
the way for general elections, which the royal government 
insists will reinvigorate democracy. But they have been 
planned by a coterie of hardline royalist advisers who were 
active in trying to suppress the 1990 democracy movement 
and who are set on excluding the parties from power. 
The confrontation between an increasingly isolated palace 
and increasingly militant mainstream activists has benefited 
the Maoists. Since they ended their unilateral ceasefire on 
2 January, they have sustained an intense and effective 
military campaign. Their new concentration on small 
urban attacks has been carefully calibrated and well 
planned. They have demonstrated that they remain a force 
to be reckoned with, and their attacks on major cities 
undermine the government’s claim that it has broken their 
back and rendered them incapable of serious trouble. Most 
importantly, they are still the only political player with a 
coherent strategy. 
Despite the promise held out by the November 2005 seven 
parties-Maoist agreement, there is a fundamental dispute 
over how to progress towards peace. The traditional view 
that the palace and parties must first unite and then deal 
with the Maoists is still supported in certain quarters, most 
vocally the U.S. Others, not least the mainstream parties 
themselves, have given up hope of a stable alliance with 
the palace and are looking to move more directly to a new 
constitutional settlement that can bring the Maoists into 
non-violent competitive politics. 
The combination of peaceful party protests and armed 
Maoist action has shaken the royal government and may 
yet derail its proposed elections. But only a serious 
change of course by the palace can dissipate the mood of 
confrontation. The role of the outside world in forcing a 
rethink is crucial. If King Gyanendra is to take it seriously, 
international concern, with targeted sanctions against his 
family and officials and a review of aid, must be both 
more explicit and more coordinated. From February 2005 
onwards, his calculation that he can essentially ignore 
external pressure has yet to be proved wrong. 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
To the Royal Government: 
1. Call off the municipal elections and initiate a 
broad-based peace process. 
2. Take up the UN Secretary-General’s offer to help 
broker and monitor a durable bilateral ceasefire to 
create an environment for serious talks in which 
to test Maoist willingness to compromise, and 
seriously consider international offers to assist in 
a process of reconciliation, including working 
towards viable post-conflict elections. 
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To the Political Parties: 
3. Go beyond the legitimate election boycott to 
develop a clear peace agenda that contains a 
positive message for steps to resolve the conflict. 
4. Resolve internal differences over a peace process 
before conducting further negotiations with the 
Maoists, agreeing most critically whether to continue 
calls for restoration of parliament or move directly 
to an interim government empowered to hold 
elections for a constituent assembly. 
5. Embrace internal reforms in order to boost 
organisational capacity and regain public 
confidence. 
To the Maoists: 
6. Respect fully stated commitments to observe 
international humanitarian law and to abide by 
international development agencies’ Basic 
Operating Guidelines. 
7. Offer a concrete plan for disarmament as part of a 
peace process and a renewed ceasefire to create 
the environment for talks. 
To the International Community: 
8. Develop a united message that sets benchmarks for 
elections as part of a peace process. The EU, which 
has limited interests in Nepal and is viewed as more 
objective than India or the U.S., can play an 
important role in setting benchmarks, which the 
UN is best placed to monitor. 
9. Form a loose contact group of key states and the 
UN to coordinate policy, leave no room for doubt 
it is united in seeking a peace settlement and return 
to democracy, and make clear to the king that 
support for continuation of the constitutional 
monarchy is neither unconditional nor guaranteed: 
he does not have a blank cheque to veto peace 
initiatives and pursue his project of dismantling 
democracy.  
10. Impose targeted sanctions, including travel bans 
and asset freezes, on the royal family, senior 
officials and military officers, and review the 
army’s lucrative involvement in UN peacekeeping 
missions. 
11. Review all development assistance channelled 
through the government. 
12. Give appropriate help to the parties and Maoists if 
they are prepared to negotiate further towards a 
peace process on the basis of their twelve-point 
agreement; do not stand in the way of third-party 
facilitation of their dialogue if they want it; and 
be prepared to help in a tripartite process should 
the king decide to enter talks. 
Kathmandu/Brussels, 31 January 2006 
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NEPAL: ELECTING CHAOS 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Nepal’s royal government is preparing for a showdown. It 
insists that its proposed municipal elections are a democratic 
exercise and that the king only stepped in because earlier 
democratic governments failed. However, the palace’s 
real aim is to sideline democratic parties and consolidate 
monarchical rule in the form that existed before the 1990 
democratic movement. Arguing that the Maoists will 
infiltrate party demonstrations, the government has 
imposed curfews and banned peaceful protests. In a move 
reminiscent of the 1 February 2005 royal coup, on 19 
January 2006 it arrested dozens of political leaders and 
activists before dawn, cut phone services and imposed 
a curfew. The crackdown was widely condemned at 
home and abroad, with the UN calling the measures 
disproportionate and in breach of the government’s legal 
commitments. Many activists remain in detention, 
including senior democratic party leaders such as Madhav 
Kumar Nepal, who is under house arrest. 
The crackdown also appeared to contradict the 
government’s earlier insistence that it had restored peace 
and security. The previous month Senior Vice Chairman 
of the Council of Ministers Tulsi Giri had explained that 
“February 1 had three objectives – tackling corruption, 
settling terrorism and holding polls – to strengthen 
democracy.…Since the government has controlled 
corruption and broken the back of terrorism, it is preparing 
to accomplish the third objective”.1 
The government may yet call a ceasefire or reach out 
to the Maoists for talks. Either option would undercut 
the peace agenda of the mainstream parties. But the 
anti-ceasefire constituency within the military and palace 
is strong, and the government has less room to offer 
substantive dialogue than during the failed negotiations of 
2003. The Maoist leadership seems to have realised that 
no side in this conflict can win a simple military victory 
but the royal government has not: it acknowledges the 
need for a political solution but insists this can come only 
after the Maoists have been forcibly disarmed. The Royal 
 
 
1 “No ceasefire, no reconciliation with seven parties: Dr Giri”, 
The Kathmandu Post, 21 December 2005. 
Nepalese Army has said that it will provide the necessary 
security for the polls.2 It insists that it is a democratically 
controlled institution which does not take sides and 
is committed to protecting human rights.3 However, a 
leading role in forcing through the elections may draw it 
further into political controversy and invite claims that it 
is serving the palace rather than the people. 
Holding elections in the midst of revived conflict and in 
the absence of effective rule of law would be a mistake. 
The prospects for free and fair elections are limited not 
only by Maoist violence but by a compromised, palace-
leaning judiciary and Election Commission. The U.S. 
ambassador has warned the royal government that polls 
held without the participation of mainstream political 
parties would be a “hollow exercise…unlikely to have 
national and international legitimacy”4 and that “Nepalis 
and the international community alike worry that the King 
is less interested in conducting free and fair elections than 
in elections intentionally designed to validate his continued 
rule”.5 In any case, election of local representatives would 
do little to revive democratic institutions as long as all 
meaningful political decisions are made by the king and 
his small coterie of advisers.6 
Pressing ahead with the election plans is exacerbating a 
situation where, in the words of the European Union, 
“political forces seem to be moving towards an ever more 
severe confrontation and polarisation thus increasing the risk 
of deepening the political crisis”.7 The EU also condemned 
the elections as “another step backwards for democracy”. 
Most of Nepal’s political spectrum, including monarchists, 
shares a similar analysis. Even Pashupati Rana, the leader 
of the major royalist party, has urged the king to call off 
 
 
2 “RNA providing security for municipal polls”, nepalnews.com, 
30 January 2006. 
3 Crisis Group interview, senior army officers, Kathmandu, 
January 2006. 
4 “Polls sans parties a hollow exercise: Moriarty”, Kantipur 
online, 27 October 2005. 
5 “U.S. troubled by circumstances surrounding polls”, U.S. 
embassy press release, Kathmandu, 26 October 2005. 
6 Why February 2006 local elections would be a mistake is 
discussed more extensively in Section IV below. 
7 “EU Declaration on Recent Events in Nepal”, Vienna and 
Kathmandu, 27 January 2006. 
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the polls, cautioning that there is no possibility of party/ 
palace reconciliation in the near future and that, given the 
choice, Nepal’s people would probably now opt for a 
republic.8 
 
 
8 “No possibility of reconciliation between king and parties: 
Rana”, nepalnews.com, 30 January 2006. 
II. THE ROYAL OFFENSIVE 
A. THE ROYAL CEO DOES WHAT HE HAS 
TO DO 
The prospect of a vigorous leadership by a businesslike 
monarch was appealing to many in a country that has 
suffered from more than its fair share of ineffective 
governments. Since his first dismissal of a democratic 
government in October 2002, Gyanendra had repeatedly 
promised a no-nonsense approach developed from his 
years of private sector experience. He robustly faced down 
international disapproval by insisting that “they will have 
to say what they have to say, and I will have to do what I 
have to do”.9 This appealed to those who felt that politicians 
had been too willing to bow to outside – especially Indian 
– pressure instead of standing up for Nepal’s national 
interest. 
As the first year of direct rule nears its end, Gyanendra’s 
ministers and supporters are boasting of his achievements. 
“The first thing each of the king’s advisers told us was that 
they had broken the Maoists’ back”, commented a senior 
diplomat who visited Nepal in late 2005.10 From the 
government’s perspective, the deal between the Maoists 
and the seven parties was a sign of both sides’ inherent 
weakness. Ministers also claim to have rooted out 
corruption and restored good governance while protecting 
the national identity and sovereignty. They insist that calls 
to restore democracy are misguided, that democracy is in 
place, reinvigorated by the king’s leadership. 
But has the year of exclusive control earned the king a 
performance bonus? The assertion that the Maoists have 
been crippled by a better managed counter-insurgency 
campaign cannot be dismissed out of hand. The Kathmandu 
valley has been more secure, and the army has improved its 
intelligence capacity, repeatedly frustrating Maoist efforts 
to organise in the capital. It recognises it cannot deliver 
security across the countryside but points to fewer 
blockades and better security in major urban areas as 
evidence of progress. 
Whatever the failings of the proactive counter-insurgency 
efforts, the security forces’ ability to hold defensive 
positions has contributed to the Maoists’ more realistic 
assessment of their chances for military victory. But the 
 
 
9 Rabindra Mishra, “Nepal’s shrewd, smooth operator”, BBC 
News, 30 April 2005. King Gyanendra made the comment in 
an interview with the national press on 24 February 2005. See 
Narayan Wagle, “Shantiko karyasuchima Nepal pravesh”, 
Kantipur, 25 February 2005; the exact phrasing has been 
variously rendered. 
10 Crisis Group interview, January 2006. 
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Maoists were more hampered by internal divisions than 
army offensives; now that they have resolved their policy 
arguments, they are demonstrating as effective a military 
and political strategy as at any point in the recent past. 
Coordinated attacks in and around Kathmandu on 14 
January 2006 exposed the weakness of state security 
measures; the Maoist commander in the Kathmandu valley 
boasted that this was a sharp answer to the government’s 
claim that it had weakened the insurgency.11 The mid-
western garrison town Nepalgunj is effectively under 
siege, with bombings or shootings on most days since the 
end of the ceasefire. Meanwhile, the agreement with the 
mainstream parties – and India’s tacit backing for it – holds 
out the prospect of their becoming a potentially powerful, 
legitimate force should they disarm. 
In general, the decisiveness with which royal edicts 
are proclaimed contrasts starkly with their impotent 
implementation. The king – and, perhaps even more, his 
ministers – must be hoping that Nepalis have forgotten 
the ambitious plan announced after the first post-coup 
cabinet meeting. Like the commitments made in the 
king’s 1 February 2005 proclamation, its 21 points have 
not been met. For an authoritarian administration, the 
royal government has shown a surprising weakness in 
pushing through practical change. 
The king’s supporters will have been heartened by his 
determined refusal to bow to domestic and international 
pressure. For diehard royalists, the effort to revoke the 
transfer of power to elected politicians in 1990 has been 
satisfying in itself. However, the record of inaction or 
incompetence on most other fronts has disappointed those 
who were willing to let the royal CEO prove himself. The 
business community is restive, and tourism entrepreneurs 
publicly criticised the failure to reciprocate the ceasefire.12 
International proponents of economic reform who were 
initially sympathetic wait in vain for delivery on promised 
action. 
When he seized power in February 2005, Gyanendra 
emphasised that Nepalis’ only wish was to end the 
violence and warned that “those who cannot stand in 
favour of peace will stand condemned by the motherland”.13 
However, his government has concentrated on cementing 
his political supremacy and has become the most 
 
 
11 Prabhakiran, press statement, 20 January 2006. 
12 For example, the chairman of the Hotel Association of 
Nepal (HAN), Narendra Bajracharya, said, “we had urged 
the government to reciprocate the truce but it did not oblige, 
which is very unfortunate for the country”. Pratibedan Baidya, 
“Calling off of ceasefire draws mixed reactions”, nepalnews.com, 
2 January 2006. 
13 King Gyanendra Bir Bikram Shah Dev, “Proclamation to the 
Nation”, 1 February 2005, available at http://www.nepalnews.com 
/archive/2005/feb/feb08/king_address.php. 
significant obstacle to peace. When presented by the 
Maoist ceasefire with an opportunity to end fighting and 
move to talks, the king and his advisers chose not to “stand 
in favour of peace”. It is perhaps on the issue of elections 
that Gyanendra has been truest to his word. On 1 February 
2005 he promised elections and return to democratic 
rule within three years, and he has charted a roadmap 
that promises just that. The questions are: what kind of 
democracy – and will it bring peace? 
B. A BELLIGERENT PALACE 
The Maoist ceasefire, even if partly tactical, offered an 
opening for dialogue. However, the royal government 
resolutely spurned domestic and international appeals to 
respond positively and appeared determined to ensure 
the Maoists would not extend it. It also dismissed the 
November 2005 agreement between the mainstream 
parties and Maoists as an “unnatural alliance”.14 The 
Maoists ended the ceasefire on 2 January 2006. 
Throughout four months of relative Maoist restraint 
(although the rebels were responsible for around a dozen 
killings as well as continued extortion and forced political 
indoctrination), state security forces remained active, their 
operations resulting in dozens of deaths.15 The Royal 
Nepalese Army says it has killed 275 Maoists from the 
start of the ceasefire to 30 January 2006, and a total of 
5,086 since the breakdown of the previous ceasefire in 
August 2003.16 
The military argued that the truce was a tactical cover the 
Maoists were using to regroup before launching a renewed 
offensive.17 This is partly true: the Maoists did indeed use 
the ceasefire to hold a two-week-long expanded central 
committee meeting, restructure their command and 
increase – at least on paper – their military capacity. Their 
attacks in January 2006 indicate a continued appetite for 
 
 
14 For an analysis of the twelve-point parties-Maoist agreement, 
see Crisis Group Asia Report N°106, Nepal’s New Alliance: 
The Mainstream Parties and the Maoists, 28 November 2005. 
Crisis Group’s extensive reporting on the February 2005 royal 
coup and its aftermath is available at www.crisisgroup.org. 
15 According to reliable estimates, state security forces were 
responsible for 62 deaths during the first three months of the 
ceasefire; in the same period the Maoists killed thirteen people. 
“Three Months of Ceasefire”, Informal Sector Service Centre, 
Kathmandu, December 2005. Announcing the end of its 
ceasefire, Prachanda, the Maoist chairman, accused the army of 
killing dozens of unarmed cadres in Palpa, Morang and other 
districts during the ceasefire. Press statement, 2 January 2006. 
16 “RNA providing security for municipal polls”, nepalnews.com, 
30 January 2006. 
17 “Yuddhabiram natak matra: sena”, Gorkhapatra, 17 
September 2005. 
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fighting and a belligerent strategy.18 However, a major 
army sweep into the Maoist heartland in late December 
2005 boosted suspicions that the government wanted to 
draw the rebels back into combat. Hundreds of the army’s 
best-trained troops were quietly withdrawn from the area 
as soon as the ceasefire ended.19 The Maoists’ return to 
war may have been a self-fulfilling prophecy. 
On the political front, the battle-lines have been clearly 
drawn. The royal government’s refusal to consider 
reciprocating the truce was matched by a steadfast 
rejection of the parties-Maoist agreement, which held out 
the possibility of accommodating the monarchy in a 
revised political set-up.20 As the parties and Maoists 
launched their active boycott of the polls, the king set off 
on his second post-coup tour of eastern districts. The 
whistle-stop schedule of photo-opportunities and generous 
state media coverage suggested electioneering but his 
preference for combat dress underlined the administration’s 
militarisation. 
The Rajparishad (Royal Council), an advisory body 
appointed by the king with no statutory powers other 
than to oversee royal succession, has geared up for 
confrontation with the parties. Standing committee 
member Sachchit Shumsher Rana, a long-retired general 
who has taken to speaking on behalf of the government, 
threatened the parties with “dire consequences” if they 
did not participate in the polls and warned that “all the 
members of the Rajparishad are ready to fight”.21 
Vice Chairman of the Council of Ministers Tulsi Giri has 
ruled out a ceasefire with the rebels and reconciliation with 
the parties.22 Home Minister Kamal Thapa has warned 
the parties of “stern action” if they boycott the polls but 
accepts that there is no constitutional provision to ban 
them.23 Nevertheless, the steady stream of threatening 
statements appeared to herald a further crackdown, just 
as similar warnings of “autocracy” by ministers and 
prominent royalists in late 2004 presaged the February 
2005 takeover.24 
 
 
18 Baburam Bhattarai, “Phauji ra gair-phauji sangharshako 
samyojanko prashna”, Samaya, 12 January 2006. 
19 “RNA halts Rolpa operation”, The Kathmandu Post, 4 
January 2006. 
20 See Crisis Group Report, Nepal’s New Alliance, op. cit. 
21 “Rajparishad ready for confrontation: Report”, nepalnews.com, 
5 January 2006. 
22 “No ceasefire, no reconciliation with seven parties: Dr 
Giri”, op. cit. 
23 “Govt. will take strong measures against attempts to foil 
polls: Minister Thapa”, nepalnews.com, December 2005. 
24 See Crisis Group Asia Report N°91, Nepal’s Royal Coup: 
Making a Bad Situation Worse, 9 February 2005. 
Thapa again warned the parties on 18 January that if they 
“knowingly or unknowingly” supported the Maoists, the 
government would “be compelled to take strong action 
under law, which may lead to an unpleasant situation”.25 
The crackdown came the next day, and while justifying 
the measures to diplomats, Foreign Minister Ramesh Nath 
Pandey threatened “unpleasant action” against anyone 
trying to disrupt the polls.26 
The palace calculation is simple but may prove effective: 
once the municipal elections are held, however troubled 
the process may be, the king will have a clear run to his 
proposed general election. The government may quickly 
announce dates, probably involving several phases 
between late autumn 2006 and early spring 2007.27 Snap 
elections are theoretically a possibility and could throw 
the parties into disarray over their response. However, 
they would only be viable if the local polls were to pass 
off without too much disturbance, a condition which can 
no longer be met. 
If the international community does not offer a principled 
critique of the municipal polls, it will be in an even weaker 
position to reject a royal roadmap for national elections, 
whether or not they are designed to further peace and 
reconciliation. The king may have some surprises up his 
sleeve – he could undercut the parties by announcing a 
ceasefire or inviting the Maoists for talks – but the problem 
of a substantive agenda remains. The palace is ever more 
firmly committed to asserting its political dominance and 
has consistently rejected the baseline Maoist demand, 
now accepted by the parties, of a constituent assembly to 
rewrite the constitution. 
The question remains open whether the palace has a plan, 
or even desire, to resolve the conflict. Victory, in the words 
of a Western envoy, “would allow the king to portray 
himself as a messiah”28 but the palace may see advantage 
in continued low-level conflict since eliminating the 
insurgency would undermine the case for authoritarian 
rule. The palace plans for war, and the king calculates 
that he can continue to fight on two fronts, containing 
the Maoists militarily and suppressing the democratic 
mainstream. 
 
 
25 “Dal mathi kada kadam chalina sakcha: Griha Mantri”, 
Nepal Samacharpatra, 19 January 2006. 
26 Statement at a briefing session for heads of diplomatic 
missions in Kathmandu, 19 January 2006. 
27 King Gyanendra has said that parliamentary elections will be 
held in the Nepali year 2063, which starts in mid-April 2006. 
“Pratinidhi sabha chunav nirdeshan”, Kantipur, 15 October 
2005. Election timing is traditionally heavily influenced by 
seasonal factors: spring and late autumn/early winter are the 
most viable periods. 
28 Crisis Group interview, Kathmandu, January 2005. 
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C. SHADES OF 1990 
The memory of the 1990 people’s movement that ended 
the Panchayat system hangs over all players in the current 
confrontation. The palace has set the scene for a replay of 
the palace-people showdown by reviving Panchayat-style 
direct royal rule and bringing back into power some of the 
key actors of that period. The political parties are trying to 
prompt a revival of the 1990 mood, hoping that cumulative 
dissatisfaction with the king’s administration can be turned 
into a successful mass movement. The Maoists – some of 
whom were part of the 1990 movement – have also used 
this history to explain their alliance with the parties.29 
In the aftermath of the people’s movement, Krishna 
Prasad Bhattarai’s interim government established a 
judicial commission to investigate abuses committed by 
the Panchayat government in suppressing protests. The 
chairman of the three-member body was Janardan Lal 
Mallik, then chief judge of the Eastern Regional Court; the 
other members, both judges, were Uday Raj Upadhyay 
and Indra Raj Pandey. The Mallik Commission was 
constituted on 23 May 1990 and submitted its report to 
the interim government on 31 December 1990. In the 
course of its investigations, it heard testimony from 
victims (or the relatives of those killed), eyewitnesses 
and those accused of violations. It concluded that over 
100 officials and politicians were directly or indirectly 
responsible for abuses, many of which resulted in death. 
The report caused problems for the interim government. 
Charged with overseeing the first democratic elections in 
decades, it was worried that pressing charges against 
police officers would demoralise them and perhaps turn 
them against the new dispensation. Arguing that ensuring 
law and order took priority, on 1 February 1991 the cabinet 
decided not to act against police officers and forwarded 
the report to the attorney general’s office for consideration 
of the remaining cases. Attorney General Moti Kaji Sthapit 
cited the cabinet’s decision to drop cases against the police 
as one reason for not proceeding with other prosecutions 
and cautioned that “court action cannot be taken against 
anyone solely on the basis of the commission’s report”.30 
The interim government’s calculation that avoiding 
confrontation with the palace and security forces was 
the best way to move forward peacefully was not 
 
 
29 For example, Baburam Bhattarai, one of the senior Maoist 
leaders, has argued that an alliance of capitalist and socialist 
forces against feudal forces has always been productive, going 
so far as to blame Third World underdevelopment on the 
blocking of “capitalist people’s revolutions”. “Andolanko 
utkarsha ra trasta satta”, Nepal, 29 January 2006. 
30 Letter to the cabinet, 7 July 1991, cited in “Mallik ayogko 
prativedan: karvahi kina ra kaslai”, Kathmandu, 1991, p. 85. 
unreasonable. The elections were a success, and the first 
democratic government did not have to pursue bitter legal 
struggles against leaders of the former regime. However, 
the decision to ignore the Mallik Commission’s findings 
was criticised at the time by activists who insisted that 
justice demanded a proper accounting for crimes committed 
by the state. The king has now chosen to surround himself 
with many of those implicated by the Mallik Commission. 
Given the role these individuals played in suppressing 
the last democracy movement, it is not surprising that 
the parties doubt the current government’s desire and 
capacity to conduct free and fair polls. 
The dying days of the Panchayat were overseen by a 
confusing cluster of committees, some of which were 
constituted specifically to suppress the democracy 
movement. The Mallik Commission concluded that these 
bodies were primarily responsible for the excessive and 
unjustified force which resulted in the deaths and injuries 
of thousands of unarmed protestors.31 Among the persons 
it identified as playing the most serious roles and against 
whom it recommended legal action be taken were the 
following senior members of the current administration 
and royal advisers: 
Rajparishad Chairman Parshu Narayan Chaudhary: 
in 1990, as education and culture minister and convener 
of the Central Coordination Committee (CCM), which 
was charged with suppressing the movement, he 
coordinated the actions of various government agencies. 
He accepted collective responsibility for loss of life and 
property but complained that under Prime Minister 
Marich Man Singh there was no discussion in cabinet 
and no attempt to defuse the protests politically.32 
Law Minister Niranjan Thapa: as state minister for 
home affairs, he was in charge of the Central Security 
Coordination Committee (CSCC), which was tasked with 
developing and implementing policies to suppress the 
movement. The commission heard that as its head he was 
“active” in suppressing the movement and ordered local 
administrators to “do whatever needs to be done to save 
the system”. 
Home Minister Kamal Thapa: as state minister for 
communications, he was a CCM member. The commission 
found that he pressed local administrators to use extreme 
force against demonstrators. Thapa accepted moral 
responsibility for his ministerial decisions but argued that 
it was not unnatural to be opposed to the democracy 
movement, and the charges against him were political.33 
 
 
31 “Mallik ayogko prativedan: karvahi kina ra kaslai”, 
Kathmandu, 1991, p. 82. 
32 Ibid., p. 77. 
33 Ibid. 
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Royal Council standing committee member and informal 
royal spokesman Sachchit Shamsher Rana: as Chief of 
Army Staff, he chaired the Central Security Committee 
(CSC), which advised the government on overall security 
strategy. 
Royal Commission for the Control of Corruption 
Chairman Bhakta Bahadur Koirala: as acting home 
secretary, he was a member of the CCM, CSC and CSCC. 
The commission heard that he repeatedly ordered local 
administrators to use inappropriate force and ensured 
implementation.34 
General Administration Minister Badri Mandal: as law 
minister, he was a member of the cabinet’s political 
committee, which worked alongside the powerful 
Panchayat Policy Investigation Committee in countering 
the democracy movement. 
Armed Police Force Inspector-General Sahabir Thapa: 
as police superintendent in Lalitpur, he was cited for his 
role in the deaths of Gyan Bahadur Shahi and Sagar 
Singh on 30 March 1990. The fatal shots were fired 
by the team under his command in contravention of the 
Local Administration Act.35 
Chief Election Commissioner Keshav Raj Rajbhandari: 
as chief district officer of Kathmandu, he was cited in 
connection with the killing of Kumar Udas Shrestha on 2 
April 1990. He gave verbal orders to police to fire warning 
shots at “extremists”; Shrestha, who was cycling home 
from his office, was hit in the head and killed. Rajbhandari 
told the commission that he had supported opening fire.36 
D. THE MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS 
The 8 February 2006 elections are for 4,146 positions in 
58 municipal bodies across 43 of Nepal’s 75 districts. 
However, just over half of the seats have no candidates 
at all, while many others have attracted only a single 
contender, who will, therefore, be elected unopposed.37 
The positions have very limited authority: few powers 
have been devolved to local bodies, and they are dependent 
on the central government for their budgets. Apart from 
chief district officers appointed by the home ministry, real 
 
 
34 Ibid., p. 76. 
35 Ibid., pp. 58-59. 
36Ibid., pp. 46-47. 
37 For lack of contestants, there will now be no elections in Ilam, 
Damak, Bhimeshwor, Bhaktapur, Banepa, Panauti, Dhulikhel, 
Ratna Nagar, Prithvi Narayan, Vyas, Waling, Palpa, Ram Gram, 
Butwal, Kapilvastu, Baglung, Birenndra Nagar, Dashrath Chand, 
Amargadi, Dipayal, Nepalgunj and Gulariya municipalities. 
“Municipal elections: No candidates for more than half seats”, 
The Kathmandu Post, 30 January 2005. 
influence is now wielded by Panchayat-style regional and 
zonal administrators answerable only to the palace. 
These will be the third local elections following the 1990 
democracy movement.38 The Communist Party of Nepal 
(Unified Marxist-Leninist, UML) dominated the last set 
in 1997, winning more than half the votes, well ahead of 
the Nepali Congress (NC).39 The Election Commission 
has issued a code of conduct transferring polling-officer 
responsibility from district judges to chief district officers, 
who are central government-appointed bureaucrats. Chief 
Election Commissioner Keshav Raj Rajbhandary has tried 
to address the security fears of officials and candidates by 
offering them life insurance.40 However, civil servants, 
who have been banned from taking leave until the polls 
are concluded, have themselves called for the elections to 
be postponed.41 
The number of eligible voters is relatively low – around 
two million (12 per cent of the electorate). As one 
commentator pointed out, if the palace sets a 25 per cent 
turnout target, it need mobilise only 500,000 voters.42 
However, candidates have been hard to find: nationwide, 
only 3,255 filed nominations on 26 January, the sole day 
to do so. Given the chance two days later, more than 600 
candidates withdrew. Many of them were reportedly 
unwilling participants in the first place; some complained 
that their names had been put forward under duress or 
without their knowledge. This left 2,104 seats without any 
candidates whatsoever: Kathmandu, for example, has 177 
posts at stake but only 98 nominations, many of them for 
the same jobs. In the Kathmandu valley not one candidate 
is from a recognised national party.43 Overall, one third 
of seats will have only a single candidate and therefore 
no competition. No municipality has candidates for all 
 
 
38 Previous local elections were held in 1992 and 1997. 
39 The UML won 51.06 per cent, the NC 30.01, the Rashtriya 
Prajatantra Party (RPP) 12.60, the Sadbhavana Party 1.23 
and others 5.09 per cent. “Party’s Position in the Local 
Bodies Election 1997”, Nepal Election Commission, 
http://www.election-commission.org.np/oldsite/11.html. 
40 “Nirvachanma khatine karmachariko bima garine”, 
Gorkhapatra, 2 January 2006; “Accident insurance for 
candidates”, The Rising Nepal, 26 January 2006. 
41 The Nepal Government Employees’ Organisation (NGEO) and 
Confederation of Nepalese Professionals (CONEP), an umbrella 
organisation of 400,000 professionals, called on the government 
to put off the polls until there was political consensus. “Civil 
servants urge government to postpone polls”, nepalnews.com, 
24 January 2006. 
42 Bharat Bhushan, “A poll to crown king of municipalities”, 
The Telegraph, 16 January 2006. 
43 “3,255 candidates file nominations for municipal polls”, 
nepalnews.com, 27 January 2006. 
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positions, from mayor through to ordinary council 
members.44  
The government created an escape clause on 24 January by 
issuing an ordinance enabling the tenure of current local 
officials to be extended.45 Some ministers have hinted that 
the elections could yet be cancelled or postponed.46 But 
despite the lack of candidates the government seems likely 
to press ahead; the chief election commissioner announced 
that extra dates for filing nominations could be given 
or that vacant posts could be filled after the election was 
completed. State-run media has hailed the nomination 
process as a success, and the continued propaganda 
drive implies that the palace’s prestige remains tied 
to completion of the exercise under any conditions. The 
Rising Nepal, a government mouthpiece, claims “the 
eagerness of the voters in all municipalities is a reflection 
of their optimism” and hails the “surge in their zeal”.47 
The fact that royalist politicians have not displayed such 
zeal has not undermined the government’s determination.  
Only one of the 72 political parties which have registered 
with the Election Commission to participate is a national 
entity – the faction of the Tarai plains-based Nepal 
Sadbhavana Party (NSP) headed by Badri Prasad Mandal, 
the minister for general administration.48 The others are 
generally obscure, with minimal organisational bases, but 
many are headed by well-known individuals who are 
relying on their personal appeal. Most other parties 
are vehicles for Panchayat-era royalists.49 None has an 
 
 
44 “Municipal polls fiasco looms”, The Kathmandu Post, 27 
January 2006. 
45 “Government promulgates ordinance empowering cabinet to 
extend the tenure of local body”, nepalnews.com, 25 January 
2006. 
46 “Will the municipal polls be called off?”, nepalnews.com, 
23 January 2006. 
47 “Polls for peace, democracy”, The Rising Nepal, 27 January 
2005. 
48 The other NSP faction is led by Anandi Devi, the widow 
of party founder Gajendra Narayan Singh. It is a member of 
the seven-party alliance. 
49 These include former Rajparishad chief Keshar Jung 
Rayamajhi’s Janata Dal (Samajbadi Prajatantrik); former 
Rashtriya Panchayat [parliament] Chairman Rajeshwar 
Devkota’s RPP (Nationalist); and Panchayat-era Foreign 
Minister K.B. Shahi’s Sanyukta Prajatantra Party. Ministers 
from the royal administrations since 2002, including some 
current ones, are also fielding parties: Salim Miya Ansari’s 
Samajbadi Party Nepal; Narayan Singh Pun’s Nepal Samata 
Party; Asharphi Shah’s Rastriya Bikas Party; Gore Bahadur 
Khapangi’s Prajatantrik Janamukti Party; Keshar Bahadur 
Bista’s new Prajatantrik Nepal; Durga Pokharel’s Nepali 
Congress (Nationalist); Kuber Sharma’s Hariyali Party; and Prem 
Bahadur Singh’s Samajbadi Prajatantrik Janata Party Nepal. 
Further parties are fronted by personalities from other walks of 
life, for example wrestler Bharat Bahadur Bisural (Conservative 
established electoral record of any significance.50 
Following the Election Commission’s decision not to 
recognise Kamal Thapa’s pro-palace faction as the official 
Rashtriya Prajatantra Party (RPP), most of its candidates 
filed nominations as independents. 
Unless the mainstream parties and Maoists manage to 
derail the polls entirely or the king changes strategy, the 
royal government will certainly declare the municipal 
elections a success. As with the unimpressive nominations 
process, ministers will seek to turn obstacles to their 
advantage. The harder the parties push to block the polls, 
the more the government will boast of its commitment to 
granting the people their democratic rights. The absence 
of impartial monitoring – potential domestic and 
international observers do not want to legitimise the 
exercise – will make it easier to advance exaggerated 
claims on turn-out and conduct. State television will 
show queues of voters and run interviews with voters, 
candidates and officials. 
Reliable sources report that the palace secretariat has met 
with local and zonal administrators to establish guidelines.51 
Palace-appointed officials are to examine the candidate 
lists for each municipality and identify those who should 
be supported. Favoured candidates may be offered 
financial and organisational assistance. Those belonging 
to the pro-palace faction of the RPP are likely to have 
preference but administrators have been instructed to 
persuade individual mainstream politicians to reject their 
parties’ boycott and stand. Government employees and 
their families are required to vote and expected to urge 
friends and neighbours to do the same. While these orders 
will be verbal, the effort to boost turn-out will be backed 
by a concerted state media campaign. However, without 
enough candidates to create even an impression of 
competitive politics, the government can hardly avoid 
charges that its elections have failed before the polling 
stations even open. 
 
 
Party) and boxer Prakash Gurung (Deshbhakta Prajatantrik 
Party). “Agami Mahanagarpalika, upamahanagarpalika ra 
nagarpalikako nirvachan prayojanko lagi darta bhaeka rajnaitik 
dalharu”, Nepal Election Commission. 
50 In the 1999 general election, even the venerable Praja Parishad 
collected only 817 votes nationwide. Others fared less well: 
the Rastrabadi Ekta Party secured 120 votes, Rastrabadi Janata 
Dal 105, Dalit Majadur Kisan Party 92, Samajbadi Garib Party 
86, Mechi Mahakali Jana Samanvaya Dal 35 votes, Liberal 
Samajbadi Party ten and Nepali Rastriya Ekta Party eight. 
Election Commission data. 
51 Crisis Group interviews, Kathmandu, January 2006. 
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III. THE OPPOSITION 
A. THE MAOISTS MOBILISE 
The king and the parties have battles on their hands but 
the line each intends to follow is relatively clear: the king 
means to press on with elections regardless of opposition, 
and the parties to marshal enough street opposition to derail 
them. The Maoists have benefited the most from the 
events of 2005 and remain in a strong situation. However, 
they face difficult choices. The end of the ceasefire and 
resumption of fighting may have been inevitable given 
the lack of government reciprocity but their next moves 
must balance conflicting imperatives. 
Keeping the parties on board. Using force while 
maintaining a loose alliance with the non-violent 
mainstream is a tough challenge. Some in the parties may 
tacitly welcome armed support for their campaign against 
the polls; others may find it unacceptable and push to end 
cooperation with the Maoists. 
Striking hard but not looking too dangerous. The 
Maoists are under pressure to prove that they offered a 
ceasefire from a position of strength and still have the 
capacity to threaten the state militarily but know that if 
they look capable of a full takeover, the world will back 
Gyanendra regardless of qualms about democracy. 
Satisfying their cadres. On 13 February 2006 the 
insurgency enters its eleventh year. Battle-hardened cadres, 
schooled for total victory, were becoming restive during 
the ceasefire. The leadership will find it hard to offer 
concessions if it cannot deliver results to its foot soldiers. 
Keeping doors to dialogue open. The Maoists have 
worked hard to build bridges with their domestic and 
international opponents, presenting a more moderate 
face and committing themselves to democracy and 
respect for fundamental human rights. Maintaining 
this approach will be hard while they are fighting. 
The end of the ceasefire prompted widespread international 
disappointment. India termed it an “unfortunate 
decision….We have consistently called upon the Maoists 
to abandon the path of violence and terror, accept the 
discipline of multi-party democracy, and work for a 
political settlement that contributes to the political stability 
and economic prosperity of Nepal”.52 The U.S. warned 
that “there can be no excuse for the resumption of 
 
 
52 “In response to a question on the withdrawal of ceasefire by 
the Maoists in Nepal”, Statement by the Ministry of External 
Affairs’ official spokesperson, New Delhi, 2 January 2006. 
violence”,53 as did the European Union, which also noted 
that it was “deeply disappointed by the government’s 
failure to reciprocate the truce”.54 In a last-ditch effort to 
persuade both armed parties to move to dialogue, UN 
Secretary-General Kofi Annan expressed concern at the 
likely escalation in fighting and deeply regretted that 
“despite the appeal of so many national and international 
voices, including his own, no progress appears to have 
been made towards a mutually agreed truce between the 
Government of Nepal and the CPN-M”.55 
Nevertheless, the return to fighting was predictable. As 
one diplomat put it, “The Maoists were hardly likely to 
continue extending [the ceasefire] indefinitely without a 
response from the government – to that extent their 
behaviour is understandable. But they have to realise 
that no one can condone an armed insurgency, and the 
political parties will come under pressure to distance 
themselves”.56 So far, the Maoist calculation is that they 
can ride out this level of political pressure. 
B. “STRIKING THE HEAD” 
The four weeks of resumed fighting have been the most 
violent since 2001 in terms of numbers of attacks. The 
Maoists do not appear weaker, and they have refined their 
tactics. Attacks on Kathmandu and Nepalgunj indicate a 
bolder targeting of urban centres but careful avoidance of 
the head-on, mass assaults against well defended military 
targets that led to high casualties in early 2005. Fewer 
civilians have been killed or injured than in previous 
actions. 
The slogan for the new military strategy the Maoists 
formulated during their October 2005 central committee 
plenum is “stand on the spine to strike the head”. The 
spine refers to highways, peripheral supply routes and 
military bases, while the head refers to urban areas in 
general and Kathmandu in particular.57 
The Maoists also restructured their military and its 
operational methods. Alongside the Eastern and Western 
Commands, they have established a Special Central 
Command.58 Formation of the latter, which covers 
 
 
53 Sean McCormack, spokesman of the U.S. State Department, 
press statement, Washington DC, 3 January 2006. 
54 “Declaration by the Presidency on behalf of the European 
Union in response to the statement by Maoists to end the 
unilateral ceasefire”, Brussels, 5 January 2006. 
55 Press statement, 30 December 2005. 
56 Crisis Group interview, Kathmandu, January 2006. 
57 Bharat Bhushan, “Target head in assault on spine”, The 
Telegraph, 15 January 2006. 
58 The “in-charges” of the Eastern, Western and Special Central 
Commands are Badal (Ram Bahadur Thapa), Diwakar (Post 
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Kathmandu and the surrounding area and consists of 
four regional bureaus, reflects the increased priority they 
are giving to the base of central state power. The Special 
Central Command has been tasked with organising local 
Newar and Tamang communities (which dominate the 
valley and its surrounding hills respectively) as a mass 
base. The first national gatherings of the Newa National 
Liberation Front and Tamang National Liberation Front, 
Maoist ethnic fronts, were held in December 2005.59 
The plenum also expanded the armed force – the People’s 
Liberation Army (PLA) – from three to seven divisions.60 
Under party Chairman Prachanda, the supreme commander, 
four deputy commanders have been appointed: Ananta 
(Special Command), Prabhakar (Western Command), 
Baldev (Eastern Command) and Pasang (headquarters 
and responsible for the “People’s Military Academy”).61 
According to Prachanda, half of all political cadres will be 
transferred to military duties to fill the ranks of the new 
divisions.62 The plenum also demoted all party committees 
and officials by one level. Following dissolution of the 
central committee, politburo and standing committee, it 
formed a 33-member Seventh Convention Organising 
Committee under Prachanda.63 Regional and district 
commanders have been reassigned across the country.64 
The Maoists want to engage the security forces in small 
actions to prove they cannot keep urban areas safe. They 
have shifted to greater use of carefully targeted improvised 
explosive devices and of close quarter attacks that rely 
more on stealth and surprise than numbers. They have hit 
the same locations repeatedly, increasing the general sense 
of insecurity and underlining the weakness of the state 
even during a period of heightened alert. Nepalgunj, the 
mid-western headquarters and most fortified town 
after Kathmandu, has experienced bombings or shootings 
three or four times a week throughout January 2006. 
The Maoists claim these serial attacks have led to five 
security posts being removed from the town centre.65 
 
 
Bahadur Bogati) and Ananta (Varshaman Pun) respectively. 
Crisis Group interview, Nepal, December 2005. 
59 Janadesh, 20 December 2005. 
60 The first and second PLA divisions are under the Eastern 
Command, the third division under the Special Central 
Command, and the fourth, fifth, sixth and seventh divisions 
under the Western Command. The fifth division’s popular 
commander, Sunil (Kim Bahadur Thapa of Rolpa), was killed 
during an army helicopter attack at Jinabang, Rolpa district, on 
29 November 2005. 
61 Crisis Group interviews, Maoist sources, Nepal, December 
2005. 
62 Quoted in Naya Dishabodh, November 2005.  
63 Prachanda, press statement, 28 November 2005. 
64 Crisis Group interviews, Kathmandu, January 2006. 
65 Krishna Sen Online, accessed on 25 January 2006. 
Attacks on the cities are also conceived by the rebels as 
preparation for their long-planned campaign of armed 
urban insurrection. While the immediate aim is to disrupt 
the polls, the mid-term goal is to pursue their strategic 
offensive plan, which depends on greater success in urban 
warfare and political mobilisation.66 While they have 
pursued a negotiation strategy with the political parties 
that envisages compromises, they continue to frame their 
present actions as preparation for urban mass insurrection 
to establish a republic.67 
The Maoists have sustained a high-intensity campaign. 
Through 26 January, they have carried out 52 bombings 
across the country, over twenty targeting government 
offices, launched seven shooting attacks on security offices 
and check posts and been involved in some seven armed 
engagements. They have killed at least one mayoral 
candidate and abducted another.68 Although civilian 
casualties seem to be low, both sides have taken heavier 
casualties, with 40 security personnel and 41 Maoists 
reported killed. A major assault on Phapar Bari, 
Makwanpur district, resulted in the deaths of at least 
seventeen Maoists, two civilians and six soldiers. Maoists 
attacked the major district headquarters of Dhangadhi 
twice, on 11 and 25 January, while Nepalgunj experienced 
significant attacks on 20, 24 and 25 January. 
On 14 January, Kathmandu was targeted with multiple 
simultaneous attacks for the first time, the strategically 
most significant of which was on Thankot, the main road 
entry point of the valley; other bombings and an attack on 
a police station outside the city brought police deaths to 
twelve, including one inspector, while the Maoists seized 
31 guns. They will not be able to sustain a campaign at 
this level indefinitely, and there has long been a question 
mark over their ability to incite urban insurrection. But for 
the time being they have demonstrated strength and tactical 
sophistication. Their planned nationwide shutdown over 
the election period will almost certainly be accompanied 
by further headline blows at the country’s “head”. 
 
 
66 The Maoists declared in August 2004 that they had entered 
the third and final phase of their “people’s war”, that of strategic 
offensive. Its first stage was completed by October 2005, and 
current actions are conceived as part of a second stage. For 
detailed analysis of Maoist strategy, see Crisis Group Asia 
Report N°104, Nepal’s Maoists: Their Aims, Structure and 
Strategy, 27 October 2005. 
67 Ananta, press statement, 15 January 2006. 
68 The Maoists killed Bijaya Lal Das, an NSP (Mandal faction) 
Janakpur mayoral candidate, on 22 January 2006 and abducted 
Ram Kumar Tharu, also a mayoral candidate of that party, 
from Gulariya, Banke district, on 25 January. 
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C. THE PARTIES PROTEST 
The parties have a simple short-term goal: to oppose the 
municipal elections and, if they cannot persuade the king 
to call them off, to expose their lack of credibility. This 
second, more limited, goal may have been achieved 
already. Few outside palace circles view the elections as 
legitimate, and the latest crackdown will only make the 
lack of a level playing field more obvious. However, it 
will not be easy for the parties to derail the elections 
altogether and reassert their political primacy. 
Lack of numbers. The parties’ only real weapon is their 
support base but they have yet to bring sufficient protestors 
onto the streets. If demonstrations do not reach a critical 
mass, confident claims of ability to mobilise hundreds 
of thousands will ring hollow. The cadre-based UML 
has been more successful than the mass-based Nepali 
Congress, whose more radical grassroots members and 
student activists have not been inspired by the party’s 
current leadership. Resources may also be a constraint 
when it comes to sustaining a lengthy protest campaign. 
Still, gatherings such as the Janakpur rally of 12 January, 
which drew well over 100,000, have buoyed party morale. 
The 19 January crackdown suggests that the government 
was afraid that the announced seven-party Kathmandu 
rally would be even more impressive. 
Dealing with the Maoists. The parties hailed their 
November 2005 agreement with the Maoists as a 
breakthrough but it will not be easy to put it into practice. 
Concerns have come not only from some smaller members 
of the seven-party alliance but also from senior leaders 
within the Nepali Congress. The Maoists consider the 
parties have not matched their concessions and still doubt 
the commitment to face down the palace. But most 
mainstream politicians will find it hard to stand by the 
Maoists if they continue the armed campaign. 
Unclear agenda. The agreement with the Maoists should 
have allowed the parties to go to the public with a simple 
message: that they could deliver peace. But policy 
pronouncements have lacked clarity. Bold anti-monarchical 
rhetoric has been balanced by calls for compromise with 
the palace. As with their continued demand for restoration 
of the last parliament, the seven-party alliance’s focus on 
disrupting the polls risks looking self-serving unless tied 
to a peace agenda.69 
 
 
69 The parliamentary parties which make up the seven-party 
alliance are the Nepali Congress (NC); Communist Party of 
Nepal (Unified Marxist-Leninist, UML); Nepal Sadbhavana 
Party (NSP, Anandi Devi); Nepali Congress (Democratic, 
NC(D)); Janamorcha Nepal; Nepal Workers and Peasants 
Party (NWPP); and the United Left Front. 
Fragile unity. The seven-party alliance is holding 
together; other parties have joined its boycott of the 
polls, and it has been widely praised for drawing the 
Maoists into a basic agreement to respect democracy. 
But there are fractures within and between its constituent 
elements, while top-level leaders still disagree on longer 
term strategies. The UML’s success at getting out its 
supporters has heightened rivalries: there were more 
protestors at its unilateral 2 December 2005 Kathmandu 
demonstration than at the joint seven-party affair two 
weeks later. 
Nevertheless, these difficulties will not necessarily comfort 
the king. The major royalist parties – the Rashtriya 
Prajatantra Party (RPP) and its offshoot, the Rashtriya 
Janashakti Party – have also refused to take part in the 
elections. This prompted the RPP split, with senior leaders 
who had been brought into the cabinet in a December 
2005 reshuffle insisting on backing the royal coup and 
campaigning. The palace had been conspicuously isolated 
but now – by design, according to RPP officials who 
accuse it of plotting and funding the schism – the king 
may have his own party. Efforts to tempt mainstream 
party members to participate in the polls, however, do 
not appear to have succeeded. 
The parties’ real challenge is to transform the passive 
public preference for democracy and peace into an active 
movement with a forward-looking agenda. Leaders admit 
that they are under increasing pressure from their own 
activists to embrace a republican agenda and have 
adopted a firmer stance towards the palace. “There will 
be no compromise at the expense of democracy”, insists 
NC president Girija Prasad Koirala. “Any deal with the 
king can only be on the basis of an end to autocracy and 
the restoration of peace and full democracy”.70 The UML 
has ruled out talks with the king, and former Prime 
Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba’s Nepali Congress 
(Democratic) has, like its mother party, removed the 
commitment to constitutional monarchy from its statute. 
The parties see the candidate-registration fiasco as an 
interim victory and are convinced their movement will 
gather pace. They hope to bring enough protestors onto 
the streets not just to disrupt the polls but to force the 
palace to back down and restore democracy. 
 
 
70 Crisis Group interview, Kathmandu, January 2006. 
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IV. LOCAL POLLS: MEANINGFUL 
DEMOCRACY? 
A. WHAT’S WRONG WITH ELECTIONS? 
Elections are overdue. A fresh mandate for political leaders 
could reinvigorate democratic governance and provide 
popular endorsement of an administration whose main 
task would be to negotiate peace. Unfortunately, however, 
the municipal elections will not be free, fair or credible. 
Filling local posts with palace placemen will neither restart 
the national democratic process nor bring a peace process 
closer. The intention is more likely the reverse. If the aim 
is to work towards full national polls, the palace should be 
trying to create conditions to bring in the mainstream 
parties. In the words of a Western diplomat, “elections 
should be part of a peace process, not a war process”.71 
The king’s supporters argue that outsiders have no right to 
judge Nepal’s internal affairs.72 Foreign Minister Ramesh 
Nath Pandey used his trip to New York for the September 
2005 UN General Assembly to assert that there is no 
universal model of democracy.73 The support that he 
curried with states such as China, North Korea, Cuba and 
Pakistan in the wake of the royal coup suggests the palace 
has a broad definition of democracy. However, King 
Gyanendra has set himself higher standards: “a meaningful 
exercise in democracy can take place only when elected 
representatives at all levels are given their share in 
the governance of the country in accordance with the 
principles of separation of powers”.74 This statement 
makes clear that the validity of the democratic exercise 
will be determined by further conditions. The current 
circumstances offer neither a separation of powers nor the 
basic mechanisms to ensure a free and fair vote. 
Continued rule by decree. In the absence of a legislature, 
Nepal is governed at all levels by royal fiat. There are no 
systems of democratic checks and balances, formal or 
informal. Critical scrutiny of royal ordinances – which 
constitutionally have to be ratified by parliament – is 
impossible. The 19 January crackdown underlined the 
possibility that security measures may be used deliberately 
to target non-violent political opponents of the royal 
government. 
 
 
71 Crisis Group interview, Kathmandu, December 2005. 
72 The king himself further alleged that “foreign money” 
was behind unspecified “undesirable things” happening in 
Kathmandu. “Bideshi paisama nachahindo kam bhairahechha”, 
Kantipur, 23 September 2005. 
73 Statement by Ramesh Nath Pandey at the UN General 
Assembly, 21 September 2005, http://www.un.org/webcast/ 
ga/60/statements/nepal050921eng.pdf. 
74 King Gyanendra, “Proclamation to the Nation”, op. cit. 
Compromised judicial independence. Palace influence 
over the appointment of judges has led to a breakdown of 
trust between legal professionals and the judiciary.75 
Attorney General Pawan Kumar Ojha surprised observers 
by insisting that divine right places the actions of a Hindu 
king beyond legal question;76 he was rewarded with 
appointment to the Supreme Court. Chief Justice Dilip 
Kumar Paudel’s enthusiastic attendance of Rajparishad 
meetings has undermined hopes that some recent critical 
judgements indicated a more independent-minded 
judiciary. 
Tainted electoral process. Chief Election Commissioner 
Rajbhandari has been acting more as government 
spokesman than impartial official. He has forcefully urged 
all parties to participate and threatened to revoke the 
recognition of those that boycott.77 Apart from his record 
in suppressing the 1990 democracy movement, he faces 
fresh allegations of using influence to take possession of 
valuable government land in the name of a family trust.78 
Election officials have been given extensive discretionary 
powers such as allowing people to vote without proper 
registration or identification; similar largesse was granted 
to candidates who were allowed to file without the 
required nominator and seconder being present. 
Censored media. On 9 October 2005, Gyanendra 
promulgated an ordinance amending six key media laws. 
Following a detailed legal analysis of the ordinance, the 
International Commission of Jurists concluded that “the 
amendments entrench restrictions imposed on the media 
by the Government during the three-month state of 
emergency that ended in April 2005, and impose new 
limitations that will further undermine freedom of 
expression, press freedom and the right to receive 
information in Nepal”.79 According to Reporters sans 
Frontières (RSF), Nepal was responsible for more than 
half the global cases of censorship in 2005; it also lists 
Nepal as one of fifteen “enemies of the internet” for 
blocking access to critical websites.80 
 
 
75 See “SC regrets bar decisions”, The Kathmandu Post, 4 
January 2006; “Lawyers protest appointment of ad-hoc justices”, 
nepalnews.com, 6 January 2006. 
76 “All orders from Hindu king constitutional”, The Kathmandu 
Post, 22 November 2005. 
77 “Parties’ recognition to be revoked if polls boycotted”, 
The Himalayan Times, 21 December 2005. 
78 Kiran Bhandari, “Sarkari jagga hadapne dau”, Samay, 27 
January 2006. 
79 “Power to Silence: Nepal’s New Media Ordinance”, 
International Commission of Jurists, December 2005. The 
report argues that the ordinance violates Nepal’s international 
legal commitments and its own constitutional guarantees of 
free expression. 
80 “Press freedom in 2005”, Reporters sans Frontières, 4 January 
2006, http://www.rsf.org. The large number of individual 
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Insecurity. Preparations for the polls are taking place 
against a background of intensifying conflict. While the 
mainstream parties’ “active boycott” may cause practical 
disruption, the Maoists’ resumption of armed violence 
undermines the prospects for a meaningful vote. The 
Maoists’ commander in the Kathmandu valley has warned 
that candidates, their associates and other officials “should 
be prepared to suffer the most serious consequences” if 
they do not dissociate themselves from the polls.81 
Although the Maoists promised the UN that they would 
not take physical action against individuals involved in 
the polls,82 the killing of Bijay Lal Das, an NSP faction 
candidate for mayor in Janakpur, suggests this vow has 
been broken.83 The insurgents are also suspected of the 
shooting and serious wounding of another mayoral 
candidate, Dal Bahadur Rai, on 30 January in the heart of 
Kathmandu’s twin city, Patan.84 Even royalist parties have 
threatened to pull out if the government cannot guarantee 
their security.85 Meanwhile, just as some people were 
forced to stand as candidates, the possibility of security 
forces exerting pressure on citizens to vote and to prevent 
opposition demonstrations remains. 
B. BASIC BENCHMARKS 
If the primary aim of the government and people is peace, 
the most important test of the municipal polls is whether 
they will contribute to a peace process. The heightened 
political tensions of the post-royal coup environment and 
the return to armed conflict make this a particularly 
challenging test. Even in the context of a negotiated peace 
 
 
censorship incidents does not necessarily relate to the general 
level of threat to independent journalists. The other “enemies of 
the internet” cited by the organisation are Belarus, Burma, China, 
Cuba, Iran, Libya, the Maldives, North Korea, Saudi Arabia, 
Syria, Tunisia, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Vietnam. 
81 Prabhakiran, press statement, 20 January 2006. 
82 When asked for a clarification of their threats of “people’s 
action” against candidates and officials involved in the polls, the 
Maoists responded that they did not intend to use violence. See 
“OHCHR receives assurance from CPN(M) leadership”, United 
Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights in 
Nepal press release, 28 December 2005, http://www.un.org.np/ 
headlines.php; “No physical action, Maoists tell Martin”, The 
Kathmandu Post, 28 December 2005. 
83 The Maoists have not claimed responsibility for the killing 
but the UN OHCHR has called on them to condemn it and 
hold its cadres to account if they were responsible. OHCHR 
Press Release, 23 January 2006. 
84 “Mayoral candidate shot in Patan”, ekantipur.com, 30 
January 2006. 
85 The general secretaries of the NSP faction that is a member 
of the government and of the Prajatantrik Nepal Party issued 
this warning after the Maoist attacks around Kathmandu on 14 
January, Annapurna Post, 16 January 2006. 
settlement, management of elections is fraught with 
difficulties. An expert explains: 
To demilitarise politics entails building norms and 
institutions that bridge the structures of wartime 
based on insecurity and fear (such as militias and 
extreme nationalist groups) to structures based on 
security and trust that can sustain peace and 
democracy (such as political parties and civil 
society). The powerful actors that developed and 
were sustained during a protracted civil war cannot 
be wished away: Neither can the enabling 
environment for peaceful political competition be 
proclaimed into existence.86 
Despite several successful elections between 1991 and 
1999, Nepal does not present the most promising base 
for using voting to force-feed either conflict resolution or 
democratic consolidation. Even before the first royal 
power grab of October 2002, a close observer had 
characterised the country as a clear example of “feckless 
pluralism”, a state in which broad popular participation 
in elections does not otherwise translate into political 
participation and in which public belief in the ideal of 
democracy contrasts with disaffection with disconnected 
political elites.87 While such an assessment appears to 
complement royalist criticisms of democratic politicians, 
the municipal polls do not appear part of a plan to address 
this fundamental difficulty. Indeed, they are more likely 
to reinforce the obstacles to meaningful democracy. 
Indian and Western diplomats share the democratic parties’ 
conviction that the ultimate objective of an election 
process must be the return to parliamentary rule and 
not Panchayat-style guided democracy under palace 
direction.88 In preparation for the visit of the European 
Union Troika in October 2005, EU diplomats had identified 
five basic requirements for meaningful elections: 
? restoration of political normality; 
 
 
86 Terrence Lyons, “Post-conflict Elections: War Termination, 
Democratisation, and Demilitarising Politics”, Working Paper 
20, Institute for Conflict Analysis & Resolution, February 2002, 
p. 13. 
87 Thomas Carothers, “The End of the Transition Paradigm”, 
Journal of Democracy, vol. 13: 1, January 2002, pp. 10–11. 
88 For instance, Indian Ambassador Shiva Shankar Mukherjee 
told a television interviewer: “The political parties [are] 
boycotting the municipal polls…and the seven-party alliance 
represents about 95 per cent in the old parliament. That puts up 
in our mind a big question mark as to whether these elections 
will be free and fair, whether they will be credible”. Kantipur 
Television, 8 January 2006. See also “Monarchy should not 
compete with political parties: Indian envoy”, nepalnews.com, 8 
January 2006. 
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? the security situation to allow them to be 
meaningful; 
? the parties to be able to compete on a level playing 
field for posts carrying real responsibilities; 
? that they be free, fair and transparent; and 
? that they take place in the context of a wider 
agreement on an overall peace process. 
In public comments, the Troika leader, Tom Phillips of the 
UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office, diplomatically 
observed that “in a country in a conflict situation, elections 
usually come at the end of a peace process”.89 The EU 
also underlined that it supports the right to peaceful 
protest.90 A month later, noting that elections were 
announced around the same time as the restrictive media 
ordinance, U.S. Ambassador James Moriarty agreed that 
“the parties have legitimate concerns whether elections 
under the current circumstances can be free and fair…. 
The impression given is that there is not going to be a 
level playing field….Again, it’s [incumbent] upon the 
government to reach out to the parties and ask them what 
they need to do for the parties to take part in the elections”.91 
C. LESSONS FROM OTHER CONFLICTS 
Holding local elections is a relatively uncommon strategy 
in conflict or immediate post-conflict situations. Countries 
emerging from conflict normally aim for national 
elections, parliamentary or presidential. Local elections 
are usually seen as less of a priority and are often held 
only after some years of transition. 
There have, however, been instances of local elections in 
a conflict or near-conflict situation preceding national 
elections. Indeed, the “bottom-up” approach of starting 
with municipal elections has become a feature of UN 
practice in countries which lack democratic experience. 
According to one analyst, “this approach is particularly 
suited to ‘state-building’ elections, which can help develop 
party politics from the ground up”.92 Nevertheless, Nepal 
 
 
89 “There is a strong risk of political collapse in Nepal: EU 
Troika”, nepalnews.com, 6 October 2005. 
90 European Union press statement, Kathmandu, 6 October 
2005. 
91 “Nepal will collapse without reconciliation: Moriarty”, 
Kathmandu Post, 8 November 2005. 
92 Benjamin Reilly, “Postconflict elections: Constraints and 
Dangers”, International Peacekeeping, vol. 9:2, Summer 2002, 
p. 122. Crisis Group recommended a similar approach in Iraq, 
arguing that local elections could be a viable interim solution 
until the security situation permitted national elections. Crisis 
Group Middle East Report N°33, Iraq: Can Local Governance 
Save Central Government?, 27 October 2004; see also Robert 
does not have the same need “to encourage the 
development of party politics and to inculcate voters in 
the routines of electoral politics”93 as the areas, such as 
Kosovo, to which such arguments have been applied.  
The record of cases where local elections have preceded 
national elections in a post-conflict situation is mixed. 
Two African examples are fairly positive. Local elections 
in Rwanda in 1999 were deeply flawed – primarily due to 
the absence of secret balloting in many constituencies – 
but did not lead to chaos. District elections in 2001 and 
national elections in 2003 showed gradual progress. 
Burundi held local elections in June 2005 against an unsure 
backdrop but these led to sounder national elections later 
in the year.94 It had the advantage of learning from less 
successful polls in June 1993, which had inflamed ethnic 
tensions domestically and in neighbouring Rwanda. 
Other experiences illustrate potential dangers. The 
widespread view that 1987 local elections in Indian-
administered Kashmir were rigged contributed to a boycott 
of the 1989 parliamentary elections and the flaring up of a 
violent secessionist movement. Algeria’s local elections in 
1990 were seriously rigged and boycotted by the centrist 
parties. Despite the rigging – and probably because of the 
boycott – the fundamentalist FIS won decisively. When it 
also won national elections the following year, a military 
coup kept it from taking power, and democracy was 
suspended for years. 
In Bosnia in June 1996, Crisis Group monitored Mostar’s 
city elections and recommended that the general elections 
scheduled for September be postponed and that the 
Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
(OSCE) “should not preside over an election which will 
only lend a sheen of democratic legitimacy to a process 
neither fair nor free”.95 The polls took place and led, as 
the then OSCE Chairman in Office Flavio Cotti had 
warned, to a “pseudo-democratic legitimisation of extreme 
nationalist power structures”.96 
There is no universal argument against holding local 
elections before national ones, even if execution is likely 
to be flawed. Because local elections generally have lower 
stakes than national ones, they can build confidence among 
the parties, provided they are reasonably honest as by and 
 
 
Malley and Joost Hiltermann, “Think small in Iraq”, The New 
York Times, 30 November 2004. 
93 Benjamin Reilly, op cit. 
94 Crisis Group Africa Briefing No31, Elections in Burundi: A 
Radical Shake-up of the Political Landscape, 25 August 2005. 
95 Crisis Group Europe Report N°14, Why the Bosnian 
Elections Must Be Postponed, 14 August 1996.  
96 Crisis Group Europe Report N°42, Doing Democracy a 
Disservice: 1998 Elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 9 
September 1998.  
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large was the case in Rwanda and Burundi. However, if 
they are dishonest or heavily boycotted, they are more 
likely to inflame a conflict and reduce the chances for 
viable national elections, as illustrated in Algeria and 
Kashmir. Sri Lanka, which has continued to hold elections 
of all kinds through great instability, offers less clear 
lessons. 
Given the confrontational circumstances of Nepal’s 
proposed polls, it is reasonable to anticipate they will not 
advance conflict resolution or successful general elections. 
The relative rarity of local elections in conflict situations 
means there is no clear pattern of empirical evidence but 
the royal government is not approaching them as an 
exercise in consensus building or conflict resolution. The 
most direct parallel to Nepal may be Pakistan under 
President Musharraf, where the progression from tainted 
local polls to tainted general elections provided a 
democratic facade to authoritarian rule. Nepal’s royal 
government has no doubt studied the Pakistani model 
for using local elections to pave the way for a tame 
parliament.97 
D. DON’T JUMP THE GUN 
Elections are indeed an essential part of any democratic 
system, but only one part. Experts in democratisation 
have cautioned against the “very high expectations for 
what the establishment of regular, genuine elections will 
do for democratisation” and the assumption that “elections 
will be not just a foundation stone but a key generator over 
time of further democratic reforms”.98 The assumption 
that elections are a democratic panacea for post-war 
recovery is also misleading.  
Premature elections are particularly dangerous, often 
inflaming conflicts rather than helping to resolve them, 
especially if participation is likely to be limited. For 
example, experts at the Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace cautioned against hasty elections in 
Iraq, noting that “if elections are rushed and held without 
adequate political participation, they can provoke 
political conflict, distort emergent processes of political 
representation, and aggravate rather than heal societal 
divisions”.99 
 
 
97 Crisis Group Asia Briefing N°43, Pakistan’s Local Polls: 
Shoring Up Military Rule, 22 November 2005. 
98 Thomas Carothers, “The End of the Transition Paradigm”, 
op. cit., p. 8. 
99 Marine Ottaway and Thomas Carothers, “Avoiding the 
Dangers of Early Elections in Iraq”, Carnegie Endowment 
Policy Brief 27, October 2003, p. 7. 
Nepal is far from the only country where early elections 
have threatened further violence. In the run-up to Liberian 
presidential elections in 2003, Crisis Group called for 
the postponement of an unfair vote designed to preserve 
the status quo under Charles Taylor until a campaign 
unhindered by violence and intimidation became 
possible.100 In March 2005, Crisis Group argued that 
certain elements needed to be in place before Côte d’Ivoire’s 
presidential (October) and parliamentary (December) 
elections were to take place. These included implementation 
of the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration 
(DDR) program, voter registration and a prior referendum 
on a key constitutional article determining presidential 
eligibility.101 These conditions were not met, and the 
elections were not held. More recently, Haiti’s elections 
were postponed because of factors including bad timing 
(Christmas holidays), poor preparations, insecurity, 
corruption and lack of reconciliation between the 
political parties within the transition process.102  
It could be argued that Nepal’s polls should not be 
compared to those in other war-ravaged countries: 
elections were held earlier during the Maoist insurgency, 
and the government asserts that state structures remain 
largely intact. However, King Gyanendra himself has 
recognised that Nepal has been close to becoming a failed 
state and based his call for elections on an “improved 
security situation”.103 While his ministers have repeated 
the failed state warning,104 claims that security has 
improved ring hollow after the violent disarray following 
the end of the Maoist ceasefire. 
 
 
100 Crisis Group Africa Report N°62, Tackling Liberia: The 
Eye of the Regional Storm, 30 April 2003. 
101 Crisis Group Africa Report N°90, Côte d’Ivoire: The 
Worst May Be Yet to Come, 24 March 2005. 
102 See Crisis Group Latin America/Caribbean Briefings N°8, 
Can Haiti Hold Elections in 2005?, 3 August 2005 and N°9, 
Haiti’s Elections: The Case for a Short Delay, 25 November 
2005. Crisis Group Senior Vice President Mark Schneider 
warned that “empty elections that produce a government with 
little legitimacy could drive Haiti into permanent failed state 
status, run by drug and criminal networks”. “Q&A: Haiti’s 
security dilemma”, BBC News, 5 January 2006. 
103 His Majesty Gyanendra Bir Bikram Shah Dev, “Address to 
the Thirteenth Summit of the Heads of State or Government of 
the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation 
(SAARC)”, Dhaka, 12 November 2005. 
104 For example, “Polls to stop country from becoming a 
failed state: Lama”, nepalnews.com, 15 January 2006. 
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V. THE INTERNATIONAL ROLE 
In the aftermath of the municipal polls – and assuming the 
parties and Maoists do not gain sufficient momentum to 
topple the current government and general elections are 
announced – the international community could be 
tempted to accept the new status quo. Whatever the degree 
of resignation or frustration in certain diplomatic quarters, 
there will be little appetite for unproductive opposition. 
India, which strongly demanded a return to democracy 
following the royal coup, may choose to be satisfied that 
the king has at last produced the “roadmap” which Prime 
Minister Singh insisted on in Jakarta in April 2005. 
Following Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran’s December 
2005 visit to Kathmandu, one analyst concluded India has 
decided to reengage with the royal government: “Shyam 
Saran’s visit is a clear indication of this change. Pakistan 
has already made a heavy-handed offer to replace any aid 
withdrawn by India. Now security factors have become 
more important for India than the restoration of democracy 
in Nepal”.105 
However, for the time being at least, there has been 
no dramatic softening of Delhi’s stance. The messages 
conveyed by Shyam Saran privately to the king appear to 
have been little different from those given in public. He 
reiterated that India is not opposed to the monarchy per se 
and is ready to help the king engage the political parties 
and Maoists in constructive dialogue. Discreet back-channel 
diplomacy has been used to convey similar messages 
rather than to pave the way for a change in course.106 
India is not willing to push too hard for a settlement if it 
means intervening directly in Nepal’s affairs. The greatest 
danger may be that its willingness to engage all three 
major players could slowly solidify into a new three-pillar 
policy for stability – a stalemated palace-parties-Maoists 
triangle that could be the basis for a durable form of 
disorder. Nepal’s domestic political dynamics do not, 
however, suggest a stable balance of power is likely. 
Although the international community has not had a 
receptive audience, it has presented a slightly more united 
front. Days before the Maoist ceasefire was due to expire, 
UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan let it be known that he 
“deeply regrets that despite the appeal of so many national 
and international voices, including his own, no progress 
appears to have been made towards a mutually agreed 
truce between the Government of Nepal and the 
 
 
105 Sathish Kumar, “Rapprochement with Nepal: India’s 
Security Concerns”, Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, 
New Delhi, article no. 1,917, 3 January 2006. 
106 Crisis Group interviews, New Delhi and Kathmandu, 
January 2006. 
CPN-M”.107 This was immediately followed by an EU 
presidency statement supporting the UN’s offer to assist 
in brokering and monitoring a ceasefire.108 Following a 
lengthy television interview with the Indian ambassador, 
British envoy Keith Bloomfield commented that “I was 
struck by the closeness of our analysis … we are very 
close”.109 The Nepal mission of the Office of the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) seems to be 
encouraging both armed parties to improve their behaviour 
and take more seriously their obligations under 
international humanitarian law. 
The 19 January crackdown also appears to have 
encouraged two important – but generally silent – 
countries to speak out. Japan, Nepal’s largest bilateral 
donor, has generally refrained from commenting on 
political developments and been seen as sympathetic to 
the monarchy. But it expressed grave concern at the 
arrests, urging that “political leaders be released and that 
the freedom guaranteed by the constitution [be] restored 
promptly”.110 China, to which the palace had looked for 
support as its relations with other states cooled, noted that 
it is following “changes in Nepal’s political situation” and 
called on “all parties” to narrow their differences through 
dialogue.111 However laconic the statement, it implies a 
significant shift in approach, signalling that China may 
not oppose the coordinated action of countries which have 
been more vocally critical of royal rule and more insistent 
on seeking a democratic peace settlement. 
A focus on sustained military action against the Maoists 
still sets the U.S. apart from Indian and European 
concentration on political engagement. Washington 
refused to view the Maoist ceasefire as an opening 
for peace, instead insisting that every indication of 
compromise was designed to send false signals.112 
Nevertheless, the U.S. indirectly urged the king to 
consider reciprocating the truce: “We may not have said 
so as directly as some others but in diplomatic language 
our message was perfectly clear”, explained a senior 
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Ceasefire”, Kathmandu, 31 December 2005. 
109 “Bloomfield doubts fair polls: Report”, Nepalnews.com, 
11 January 2006. 
110 “Statement by the Press Secretary/Director-General for Press 
and Public Relations, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, on the Arrest 
of Persons concerned with Political Parties in the Kingdom of 
Nepal”, 19 January 2006, http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/ 
announce/2006/1/0119.html. 
111 Statement by Kong Quan, Chinese Foreign Ministry 
spokesman, 24 January 2006, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/ce/ 
cenp/ eng/fyrth/t232764.htm 
112 Crisis Group interviews, U.S. diplomats, Kathmandu and 
New Delhi, September and December 2005, January 2006. 
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diplomat.113 American and Indian alignment on Nepal 
policy was emphasised during Under Secretary of State 
Nicholas Burns’s visit to New Delhi. Speaking alongside 
Shyam Saran at a joint press conference, he observed that 
“the United States is very concerned by the actions of His 
Majesty the King.…We have issued a statement frankly 
very critical of that. We are equally critical, of course, of 
the Maoists….So what India and the United States can do 
together is to try to assert a joint appeal for peace and 
for democratic reconciliation in Nepal, which is very 
important”.114 
For the king, the municipal polls are a test of strength 
against not only the parties and Maoists but also the 
international community. So far he has faced down calls 
for compromise. His advisers probably feel they have 
successfully called everyone’s bluff, bar some ruffled 
diplomatic feathers and temporarily strained relations. If 
the international community is to play a meaningful role 
in encouraging conflict resolution, it will have to revise 
its approach. As a former royalist prime minister put it: 
As well as the king and the political parties, Nepal’s 
friends must recognise that their policies to date 
have failed. If they want to move forward, they 
must use fresh thinking and take advantage of new 
openings – even the twelve-point agreement 
[between the Maoists and the parties], which I 
would prefer not to have happened, could be a 
useful starting point”.115 
The international community needs to make clearer to the 
king that it will not accept his effort to turn Nepal’s political 
clock back a generation. Donors are understandably 
concerned that aid to the poorest and most vulnerable 
population groups should not be used for political 
leverage.116 In any case, crude restrictions on aid might 
not have much impact: the economy is already in serious 
trouble, though the government seems prepared to tighten 
its belt and ignore the warning signs.117 However, given 
not only the political situation but also the state’s lack of 
capacity to implement development projects, it is time to 
reconsider the benefits of channelling aid through the 
government, whether as general or sectoral budget support. 
There are also forms of leverage that would effectively 
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114 “US, India joint appeal on Nepal”, The Kathmandu Post, 
22 January 2006. 
115 Crisis Group interview, Kathmandu, January 2006. 
116 Crisis Group interviews, diplomats and aid agency staff, 
Kathmandu, January 2006. 
117 Nepal is in its second year of negative per capita GDP 
growth, and inflation has risen to over 8 per cent. On the 
economic pressures facing the royal government, see Crisis 
Group Asia Briefing N°41, Nepal: Beyond Royal Rule, 15 
September 2005. 
focus minds in the palace and among its supporters without 
hurting the people at large. Targeted sanctions against the 
royal family, ministers and senior security officials – such 
as visa bans and limitations on contacts – might cause 
enough short-term discomfort to prompt a rethink.118 
 
 
118 See Crisis Group Asia Briefing N°36, Nepal: Responding 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
Postponement of the elections and government willingness 
to consider a ceasefire could yet form the basis for 
productive tripartite talks. But this is a crucial test for the 
international community. Gyanendra has had the upper 
hand, and if he manages to brush aside opposition to the 
polls, his calculation that the outside world has no appetite 
to push too hard for democracy and peace could prove 
correct. 
The dangers of holding local elections in a context of 
armed conflict illustrate the benefits of seeking informed 
advice and reconsidering the current plan. The parties 
have made clear they are still willing to talk – as are the 
Maoists – on the basis of minimum conditions which do 
not include abolition of the monarchy. No one can be sure 
if the Maoists are sincere about dialogue and compromise 
but the only way to test them is by their actions. Closing 
the door to a possible peace process on the assumption 
that they will not deliver leaves continued conflict as the 
only option – one that has already been tried with no 
success. Pursuing it further would likely increase the risk 
of Nepal’s political collapse and certainly increase the 
suffering of its people. 
Kathmandu/Brussels, 31 January 2006 
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APPENDIX C 
 
MAP OF JANUARY 2006 SECURITY INCIDENTS 
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The International Crisis Group (Crisis Group) is an 
independent, non-profit, non-governmental organisation, 
with over 110 staff members on five continents, working 
through field-based analysis and high-level advocacy 
to prevent and resolve deadly conflict. 
Crisis Group's approach is grounded in field research. 
Teams of political analysts are located within or close by 
countries at risk of outbreak, escalation or recurrence of 
violent conflict. Based on information and assessments 
from the field, it produces analytical reports containing 
practical recommendations targeted at key international 
decision-takers. Crisis Group also publishes CrisisWatch, 
a twelve-page monthly bulletin, providing a succinct 
regular update on the state of play in all the most significant 
situations of conflict or potential conflict around the world. 
Crisis Group's reports and briefing papers are distributed 
widely by email and printed copy to officials in 
foreign ministries and international organisations and 
made available simultaneously on the website, 
www.crisisgroup.org. Crisis Group works closely with 
governments and those who influence them, including 
the media, to highlight its crisis analyses and to generate 
support for its policy prescriptions. 
The Crisis Group Board – which includes prominent 
figures from the fields of politics, diplomacy, business 
and the media – is directly involved in helping to bring 
the reports and recommendations to the attention of senior 
policy-makers around the world. Crisis Group is chaired 
by Lord Patten of Barnes, former European Commissioner 
for External Relations. President and Chief Executive 
since January 2000 is former Australian Foreign Minister 
Gareth Evans. 
Crisis Group's international headquarters are in Brussels, 
with advocacy offices in Washington DC (where it is 
based as a legal entity), New York, London and Moscow. 
The organisation currently operates fifteen field offices 
(in Amman, Belgrade, Bishkek, Bogotá, Cairo, Dakar, 
Dushanbe, Islamabad, Jakarta, Kabul, Nairobi, Pretoria, 
Pristina, Seoul and Tbilisi), with analysts working in over 
50 crisis-affected countries and territories across four 
continents. In Africa, this includes Angola, Burundi, Côte 
d'Ivoire, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Eritrea, 
Ethiopia, Guinea, Liberia, Rwanda, the Sahel region, 
Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Uganda and Zimbabwe; 
in Asia, Afghanistan, Indonesia, Kashmir, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Myanmar/Burma, Nepal, North Korea, 
Pakistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan; in 
Europe, Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Georgia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Moldova, 
Montenegro and Serbia; in the Middle East, the whole 
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